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Energy in the German-Polish Relationship 
Acknowledging Controversies – Pursuing Shared Interests 
Aleksandra Gawlikowska-Fyk, Kai-Olaf Lang, Karsten Neuhoff, Ellen Scholl, Kirsten Westphal 
Germany and Poland stand as examples of the differing interests of individual Euro-
pean Union (EU) member states in energy policy. However, both countries are crucial 
for filling an Energy Union with substance. Yet, progress in bilateral engagement has 
stalled, as controversies, for example over Nord Stream II, threaten to distract attention 
from other issues and avenues for energy cooperation. While acknowledging disagree-
ments, the focus should be on identifying areas of agreement and opportunities for 
cooperation. Although the difficulty of resolving highly controversial issues is not to be 
discounted, addressing them will require taking steps to establish trust while designing 
programs and projects to transform the idea of solidarity from rhetoric into reality. 
 
Following the annexation of Crimea by 
Russia and military action in eastern 
Ukraine, the former Polish Prime Minister 
Donald Tusk (currently President of the 
European Council) first laid out the concept 
for an Energy Union in April 2014. Tusk 
based his concept for an Energy Union on 
the assessment that “massive dependence 
on Russian energy makes Europe weak.” He 
argued that energy dependence is a threat 
and urged European solidarity in supply 
security and pursuing collective gas pur-
chases. Although the concept proposed by 
the European Commission in February 
2015 included the original security dimen-
sion – framed as energy security, solidarity, 
and trust – this was far from the sole pri-
ority. Rather, energy security is one of five 
“mutually supporting dimensions,” includ-
ing the internal energy market; energy 
efficiency as a contribution toward the 
moderation of energy demand; decarboni-
sation of the economy; and research, in-
novation, and competitiveness in accord-
ance with Europe’s long-term energy policy 
objectives of security of supply, sustain-
ability, and competitiveness. 
Despite the need for such an initiative 
to give momentum to the ongoing develop-
ment of the EU internal energy market and 
place European energy provisions in a more 
comprehensive and strategic context, the 
idea’s popularity has flagged in both coun-
tries. Neither Germany nor Poland appears 
as a strong advocate for the initiative. From 
a Polish perspective, Germany has pursued 
a self-serving energy policy course because 
the country did not consult its neighbours 
prior to the announcement of the “Energie-
wende,” and because of the Nord Stream II 
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project. For Germany, Poland has emerged 
as a major blocker of EU climate policies 
and the creation of a cross-border electricity 
market – steps that are viewed by Berlin to 
be major components for moving the Ger-
man energy transition forward. Polish com-
pany PGNiG and the Polish government 
have also submitted lawsuits to the EU 
Court of Justice against the European Com-
mission granting an exemption to OPAL. 
Subsequently, PGNiG initiated legal action 
against the related decision by German 
Regulatory Authority (BNetzA) – a strong 
move in the ongoing struggle over Russian 
gas supply. This underscores the divergence 
between the two countries – namely Ger-
many’s market-based approach in contrast 
to Poland’s state-driven approach. Poland’s 
negative reaction to the Commission’s 
decision to grant Gazprom additional usage 
of the OPAL pipeline also illustrates the 
fundamental opposition to Nord Stream II, 
and puts the country at odds with the Com-
mission despite Warsaw’s past appreciation 
of the Commission’s constructive stance in 
the program for restructuring the Polish 
coal-mining sector and proactive role in 
revising security of gas supply regulation 
and so-called intergovernmental agree-
ments. 
It is easy to see how the Energy Union, 
founded on concepts of security, solidarity, 
and trust, could run into obstacles, given 
the differing perceptions of how this should 
be achieved, what solidarity requires, and 
a general lack of trust. However, that does 
not mean trust cannot be built, and rather 
demonstrates that, for the Energy Union to 
succeed, neighbours such as Germany and 
Poland will need to work together to find 
areas of collaboration and potential 
integration. 
Recognition of Diverging Energy 
and Climate Policies 
To understand the energy issues at stake 
between the two countries and why differ-
ences remain, it is worth revisiting the de-
lineation of responsibility for energy policy 
within the EU. Under the Maastricht Treaty, 
energy remained a member state preroga-
tive, even as cooperation and integration 
were a means of achieving energy security. 
Although the Lisbon Treaty later made 
energy a joint competence and elevated 
energy security (namely security of supply) 
to the European level, countries retained 
the authority over domestic fuel mix. 
Tensions between member states in the 
energy and climate realm are frequently 
attributed to different interpretations of 
this shared competence, but are primarily 
a result of different perceptions, historical 
experiences, and political realities. These 
perceptions ultimately influence views on 
integration, cooperation, and strategies for 
ensuring energy security and sustainability. 
Germany and Poland have different energy 
plans and approaches shaped by unique 
political, social, and historical contexts. In 
addition to the salience of these differences 
in bilateral relations, they are also indica-
tive of the divergence between EU member 
states regarding climate protection and 
security of supply, and illustrate the dif-
ferent interpretations of how to achieve 
energy market integration. 
Since 2011 Germany has moved forward 
with the Energiewende. The Paris Agreement 
on climate change, supported by all EU 
member states, provides international en-
couragement, whereas Germany’s 2050 
Climate Protection Plan sets national-level 
and sectoral targets, and includes imple-
mentation measures for targets, strong 
messages on sector coupling, and establishes 
a commission on growth, structural change, 
and regional development. Although dis-
cussions of the details have been contro-
versial – for example, a precise date for the 
“coal exit” was absent from the final plan – 
the needs and goals of the Energiewende are 
widely supported. 
Poland’s climate efforts are part of a 
broader effort outlined in the national Plan 
for Responsible Development, which covers 
all sectors of the economy and is not exclu-
sive to energy. The Plan is intended to help 
Poland achieve a more dynamic economic 
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development path and avoid five identified 
“traps”: the middle-income trap, lack of 
balance trap, average product trap, demo-
graphic trap, and trap of weak institutions. 
Among the included goals are lower energy 
costs for Polish businesses and consumers, 
and achieving a higher degree of energy 
independence, to be achieved through the 
modernisation of the energy sector, diversi-
fication of (oil and gas) supply sources, grid 
investment and energy infrastructure devel-
opment, and support for low-carbon energy 
sources. Nuclear energy remains on the 
agenda, but is de facto deprioritized for the 
moment. However, this could be raised 
again in future climate talks with Germany. 
A Challenge for Both: Coal 
Before focusing on additional points of 
divergence, it should be noted that Ger-
many and Poland share more similarities 
than perhaps any other two EU member 
states when it comes to coal. Germany and 
Poland are the two largest coal producers 
and consumers in the EU. In 2015, coal con-
sumption in Germany amounted to 78.3 
million tons of oil equivalent (MTOE), 
whereas consumption in Poland amounted 
to 49.8 MTOE. Coal accounted for 44 per-
cent of total electricity generation in Ger-
many, and around 80 percent of the elec-
tricity portfolio in Poland, accounting for 
roughly half of total energy consumption. 
In a 2014 list of the so-called 30 dirtiest coal 
plants in Europe, published by the World 
Wildlife Fund, Germany and Poland to-
gether are home to nearly half of the list, 
with 13 plants between them: 9 in Germany 
and 4 in Poland. 
This has resulted in a situation where 
both countries have political difficulties in 
dealing with the role of coal in the domes-
tic economy and energy supply. However, 
although there are similarities in terms of 
coal production and consumption, the two 
countries diverge in their perception of the 
future of coal, as Poland views the resource 
as integral to energy security, whereas Ger-
man policy is grappling with the question 
of how to effectively phase out the resource. 
This is related in part to diverging energy 
trajectories: whereas electricity consump-
tion in Germany has been falling, Poland 
expects electricity demand to increase until 
2030. Poland’s energy minister recently 
announced plans to open new coal mines 
after 2019 to ensure that refurbished or 
new coal-fired power plants have access 
to cheap Polish coal. Moreover, an energy 
sector based on the use of domestic coal 
is seen as the backbone of Poland’s energy 
security. At the same time, Poland has 
introduced restrictive legislation that com-
plicates further increases in wind power. 
In this context, the modernisation of the 
energy sector in Poland is seen as the mod-
ernisation of the coal sector, rather than 
its phasing out or substantial reduction. 
This approach supports the growing 
weight of the traditionally strong state-
owned companies in the Polish energy sec-
tor. After the envisaged takeover of assets 
owned by French Engie and EDF by Polish 
companies, state-controlled shares in the 
sector will amount to more than three 
quarters. These acquisitions and require-
ments for modernisation investments put 
a strain on the financial conditions of key 
Polish energy groups. This is one of the 
reasons why the Polish government is inter-
ested in establishing a capacity market and 
potential new forms of financial assistance 
for power producers. All these measures 
need approval by the European Com-
mission. 
The divergent approaches to coal are 
one aspect of a larger difference between 
the two countries, namely perceptions on 
security of supply and how to achieve it, 
and the role of integration. Given that coal 
is a domestic resource in both countries 
and the international coal trade is liberal-
ized, security of supply concepts and con-
versations in both countries have histori-
cally focused on natural gas. 
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Natural Gas Security: A Divisive Issue 
Security of natural gas supply in Germany 
can in part be traced to Ostpolitik, the gas-
for-pipes deals with the Soviet Union in the 
1970s, and more recent experiences with 
Russia as a reliable gas supplier, linking the 
concept to a long-term relationship with a 
major supplier on (ostensibly) commercial 
and mutually beneficial terms. Moreover, 
the economic interdependence is seen as a 
means to political rapprochement, or at 
least to increase the costs of a potential 
deterioration in the relationship. Poland 
considers Russian gas supplies as a major 
threat to its (and regional) energy security 
of supply, and it aims to replace gas im-
ports from Russia through a combination 
of diversification of supplies, suppliers, and 
supply routes as well as broader energy self-
sufficiency. These are steps that have been 
promoted under the umbrella of the Energy 
Union in the “Energy Security Package” 
of February 2016, which also includes a 
reform of the security of supply regulation 
still under discussion in the EU. 
Energy security in Poland has been char-
acterized by an expressed willingness to 
pay for supplies from anywhere but Russia, 
and government officials have announced 
the country does not intend to renew its 
supply contract with Gazprom when it 
expires in 2022. Instead, the country hopes 
to reduce reliance on Russian imports, as 
indicated by the construction of the Świ-
noujście LNG terminal. The LNG terminal, 
inaugurated in the fall of 2015, provides 
Poland with the option to import LNG from 
suppliers around the world, albeit at a 
higher price than piped gas. The proposed 
Northern Gate strategy is comprised of 
several proposed pipelines, for example the 
Baltic Pipe, which would bring Norwegian 
gas to Poland and beyond to central Europe. 
The debate over Nord Stream II both 
exemplifies and arises from these differ-
ences. In Germany, Nord Stream II is largely 
perceived as a commercial project devel-
oped by private-sector actors that could 
enhance energy security, whereas in Poland 
it is considered a geopolitical threat with 
the potential to undercut European solidar-
ity and energy security. Moreover, the proj-
ect is linked to foreign and security policy. 
While German government ministries per-
ceive maintaining economic ties with Rus-
sia as having a positive side effect, this is 
perceived in Poland as limiting the EU’s 
room for political manoeuvre vis-à-vis Russia, 
and a severe blow to Ukraine, which the EU 
wants to support politically and economi-
cally. Poland is also concerned that Nord 
Stream 2 could complicate its national 
diversification efforts and fears the project 
might ultimately replace gas transit through 
the Yamal pipeline, which transports gas 
from Russia via Belarus and Poland to 
Germany. 
Rather than focus on this issue as the 
ultimate example of differences between 
Germany and Poland, it should instead 
serve as an opportunity for the two coun-
tries to acknowledge and recognize each 
other’s perspectives. Given these antago-
nistic perceptions and mistrust, nothing 
less than “squaring the circle” in bilateral 
relations is needed: it could be useful to lift 
energy issues to the political level and take 
a more objective look at the issues (“re-
politicisation without ideologisation”). 
This does not mean both sides should focus 
solely on politics, but rather recognize – 
and be aware of – the political implications 
of energy-sector decisions and acknowledge 
the link between energy and politics. This 
is critical if the relationship is to move 
beyond the status quo, as both sides must 
acknowledge differences in perceptions, 
consider how the other might perceive 
their policies, and ultimately find areas of 
shared interests and opportunities to build 
trust. Ultimately, the diverging organiza-
tion of and relationship between the role of 
the state and functioning markets need to 
be addressed. 
This may require Germany to accept that 
Polish mistrust exists, particularly when it 
comes to the impact of Germany’s energy 
policies and its reliance on external energy 
suppliers. Germany may need to take seri-
ously Polish plans and goals for the natural 
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gas sector, such as pursuing diversification 
and becoming a gas roundabout (“hub”) for 
central Europe, increasing self-sufficiency, 
and developing domestic markets. Poland 
must decide the ultimate aims of its energy 
policy and the role it would be willing 
to accept for its neighbour in that policy. 
Poland should also evaluate whether self-
sufficiency is an appropriate strategy in 
light of rising domestic consumption, EU 
climate targets, and the cost-savings from 
pooling generation and capitalizing on 
flexible resources to ensure generation 
adequacy. 
Opportunities for Cooperation: 
Soft Infrastructure 
Although energy has been a difficult topic 
of cooperation (and contention) in recent 
years, the broader and increasingly com-
plex slate of issues Germany and Poland are 
currently facing requires political attention 
and dialogue that address increasing cross-
sectoral as well as intended and unintended 
effects. Rather than focus on the most 
prevalent divisive issues, the two countries 
should seek areas of agreement and over-
lapping interests, and work to ameliorate 
concerns and focus on areas where com-
plementary skill sets and energy portfolios 
can be used to the advantage of both coun-
tries. 
The benefits of cooperation will ultimately 
follow from tangible action, including the 
improved design of soft infrastructure and 
the joint pursuit of strategic investments – 
two areas with concrete opportunities for 
cooperation. This two-pronged approach 
would help achieve policy linkages, lever-
age shared resources, and capitalize on 
complementary portfolios. Ultimately, the 
goal is to cooperate in ways that increase 
flexibility and enable the imminent energy 
transition in both countries. 
Soft infrastructure refers to institutional 
and regulatory choices, including European 
gas and electricity trading arrangements 
outlined in the European Commission’s 
2016 Packages on “Energy Security” and on 
“Clean Energy,” the European Emissions 
Trading System (EU ETS), the European 
energy governance package for post 2020, 
and the security of supply regulations. 
Meanwhile, strategic investments include 
opportunities for collaboration and shared 
gains in overlapping areas of interest, 
ranging from e-mobility to biogas. 
With respect to power markets, the Ger-
man power market design does not create 
incentives for the early provision of genera-
tion and load patterns to transmission sys-
tem operators (TSOs). Without such infor-
mation, these operators cannot reliably 
predict flow patterns and loop flows. Addi-
tionally, simplified trading models in the 
EU usually neglect physical congestions. 
The resulting unannounced power flows 
create significant complications for system 
operation in Poland. This issue was initially 
ignored in the German domestic debate, 
and Polish concerns were discounted in 
Germany as attempts to protect Polish coal-
fired generation from competition by wind 
and solar power. Meanwhile, in Poland, un-
announced power flows have been charac-
terized as an intrusion of German wind and 
solar power to the disadvantage of domestic 
power generation and system operation. 
Contrary to the claims in both countries, 
loop flows neither dampen power prices 
nor replace coal-fired power generation in 
Poland. However, they do reduce the trans-
mission capacity that can be made available 
for trade between the countries, resulting 
in markets that are disconnected most of 
the time. Additionally, unannounced power 
flows create risks for secure system opera-
tion, result in additional costs, and reduce 
the flexibility remaining for the integration 
of wind and solar power in Poland. The 
jointly pursued physical response – invest-
ment in phase shifters – provides only par-
tial and temporary relief. Instead, more 
closely coordinated operation of the inter-
connected system would bring economic, 
sustainability, and security benefits. 
These issues related to cross-border elec-
tricity flows and integration and inter-
connection underscore the larger question 
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of electricity market design. Both countries 
should discuss the broader question of EU 
and national power market design bilater-
ally and within the European context in 
order to advance a market design that pro-
vides reliable information for system oper-
ation and ensures efficient use of all the 
resources connected to the European elec-
tricity system. 
This is also an important basis for co-
operation on EU security of supply. Al-
though both countries have expressed 
hesitancy at increased obligatory regional 
cooperation on security of supply in elec-
tricity, there are also potential benefits for 
both countries, if the appropriate balance 
can be found. The December 2016 Winter 
Package could provide the framework for 
electricity cooperation and lay the ground-
work for increased discussion of regional 
cooperation. If Poland and Germany come 
to an agreement, the chances to push for 
mutually beneficial solutions at the EU 
level will grow. 
Regional cooperation in the gas sector is 
much more complicated. Different national 
perceptions on security of supply imply 
different policies for addressing it. Whereas 
Germany relies on market mechanisms and 
a flexible approach that reflects transport 
corridors and concrete challenges, Poland 
advocates for a regional approach to risk 
assessment, prevention plans, and plans for 
emergency situations or solidarity mecha-
nisms. This reflects the different nature of 
the two markets as well as the asymmetric 
speed of internal market-reform implemen-
tation. It would be worthwhile for both 
countries to acknowledge each other’s 
choices while trying to enhance coopera-
tion and solidarity. 
Another crucial, yet counterintuitive, 
component of soft infrastructure coopera-
tion is the EU ETS, which aligns European 
economic, energy security, and sustain-
ability objectives. It also ensures that all 
European power generators face the same 
price for CO2 emission allowances as the 
basis for an integrated power market. The 
structure and efficacy of the EU ETS, along 
with it proposed reforms, are currently 
being debated in the European Parliament. 
EU ETS reform has been an ongoing topic 
since the informal agreement on a draft 
to reform the program in 2015. Proposed 
reforms include acceleration of the Market 
Stability Reserve and measures to address 
the excessive surplus of allowances that 
undermines the functioning of the system. 
The EU ETS is also an important com-
ponent of Europe’s industrial policy. The 
text for the final vote in the European Par-
liament includes mechanisms to ensure 
full carbon price pass through for basic ma-
terials while securing carbon leakage pro-
tection. This is essential for material sector 
investment and creates opportunities for 
new technologies, practices and business 
models. Such a common basis across EU 
member states would encourage invest-
ment in climate-friendly options. Absent 
this common approach, member states 
will have to implement additional policies, 
creating the risk that industrial players will 
focus on the most economically relevant 
member states, thereby delaying strategic 
investment choices in the rest of Europe. 
For Poland, which still has a political 
decision to make on an energy transition 
model, backing rather than blocking an EU 
ETS might be more beneficial. To achieve 
these benefits, the Polish government should 
ensure ETS reform results in a consistent 
and robust framework that attracts and sup-
ports private investment and capitalizes on 
opportunities and financial instruments 
such as the Modernisation and Innovation 
Fund offer for strategic investments in the 
energy and industrial sectors. This is crucial, 
as Poland is in the midst of a debate about 
environmental quality. There is room for 
bilateral discussions, given the difficult deci-
sions ahead. In order to meet the climate tar-
gets and to achieve a carbon-neutral energy 
system in the future, coal – as the dirtiest 
fossil fuel – has to be eliminated from the 
energy mix: better sooner than later. 
Both countries, as well as the EU, have to 
keep the resilience of the energy system in 
mind, both for energy security reasons and 
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also to mitigate climate change. The flex-
ibility of being able to shift between gas 
and coal power generation is not only valu-
able for the power system, but also an im-
portant flexibility resource contributing to 
gas system security of supply. These are non-
trivial issues that relate to sector-coupling 
and to cross-border transactions as well. 
This creates room for open exchanges and 
frank discussions between the two coun-
tries. Both sides should explore the ramifi-
cations if the proposed reforms to the EU 
ETS currently being debated fail or are 
watered down. Some argue that in this case 
the EU ETS will create only limited incen-
tives to reduce operational hours and emis-
sions from coal power stations. In response, 
member states such as Germany will likely 
mandate a phasing-out of (less-efficient) 
coal power stations to achieve their climate 
objectives. This approach reduces the flex-
ibility of the power system to respond to 
gas supply interruptions – and thus nega-
tively impacts energy security objectives. 
It is therefore critical that member states 
understand the benefits of an effective EU 
ETS across Europe. A shared understanding 
of these benefits (rather than tactical posi-
tions) should inform the further develop-
ment of the EU ETS. If the issue of systemic 
and cross-border resilience is taken seriously, 
it is necessary to discuss the options on the 
table. A common understanding of how 
policies can be structured to achieve cli-
mate objectives while also facilitating a 
flexible shift between efficient (and modern) 
coal power plants and gas power genera-
tion would be a decisive step forward. 
Opportunities for Cooperation: 
Strategic Investments 
Meanwhile, there are concrete areas in 
which Germany and Poland could col-
laborate or cooperate, and in the process 
build trust to facilitate broader coopera-
tion. These areas of strategic investment 
include: 
E-mobility. Germany and Poland aim to 
have one million electric vehicles on the 
road by 2020 and 2025, respectively. To 
achieve this, Germany announced $1.4 bil-
lion in incentives to boost the sale of elec-
tric vehicles, including tax breaks and re-
bates on the sale of new vehicles. The Polish 
government has announced plans to intro-
duce new laws to regulate – and incentives 
to promote – the development of electric 
vehicles. The very high levels of air pollu-
tion in Polish cities during winter 2016/ 
2017 has sparked a debate about environ-
mental protection and health in some cities 
– a debate that will certainly provide propo-
nents with additional arguments for e-mobil-
ity. The close integration of the industrial 
value chain by the two countries, particu-
larly in the automotive sector, provides 
ample opportunity for cooperation on tech-
nology and infrastructure development. 
Progress on the development of electric 
vehicles may offer much needed solutions 
for power systems with regard to system 
stability and balancing, still a missing link 
in enabling renewable energy deployment. 
German and Polish cooperation and ex-
perience could even constitute the basis for 
future EU rules on e-mobility. 
Prosumers. Both countries are witnessing 
bottom-up energy developments as con-
sumers become increasingly active in energy 
production and consumption decisions, 
generally received as a positive develop-
ment in both countries. Consumers are 
more involved in issues related to flexibil-
ity, decentralization, efficiency of energy 
use, and engaged in distributed generation. 
This could serve as a basis for cooperation 
between the two countries in developing 
and adapting regulatory structures, tech-
nologies, and business models. The grounds 
for this cooperation can already be found 
at the local government level, which should 
be further strengthened and incentivized. 
Energy efficiency. Efficiency improvement, 
particularly in the building sector, is a pri-
ority in both countries and remains a key 
struggle for policymakers. Cooperation can 
allow for the sharing of experiences and 
leveraging of mutual strengths, including 
expertise and finance. 
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Joint renewable projects. In 2016, Germany 
began to hold auctions to open 5 percent of 
the yearly installed renewables capacity to 
other member states, presenting a potential 
opportunity for Poland, which is interested 
in solar photovoltaic (PV). Cooperation on 
this issue could be an opportunity to help 
Poland meet summer peak demand and 
alleviate brownouts that, in recent years, 
have coincided with peak mid-day demand 
on summer days. To accelerate PV invest-
ment beyond the scale of a few 100 MW of 
joint projects, it would be desirable to facili-
tate access to low-cost finance. One option 
could be to combine suitable national re-
muneration mechanisms with preferential 
loans or guarantee products from the Euro-
pean Investment Bank or the German Devel-
opment Loan Corporation (KfW). 
Underscoring the potential utility (and 
attractiveness) of such cooperation, an 
analysis of the 2015 heat wave in Poland 
concluded that the limited possibility for 
energy imports from abroad was a contrib-
uting factor. Commercially available inter-
connection between Poland and neighbour-
ing countries, including Germany, could 
contribute to power generation adequacy. 
Biogas / biomethane. Both countries have 
an interest in biogas and biomethane as 
contributors to a more sustainable fuel 
mix. They could work together to develop a 
regulatory framework and an EU system to 
share, trade, and integrate. Systemic solu-
tions such as power-to-gas could be further 
exploited, given the know-how and the 
existing gas infrastructure. Germany is a 
leader in the EU when it comes to the pro-
duction of energy from biogas, whereas 
Poland has the potential to increase energy 
production from biogas. 
Conclusions 
In German-Polish energy relations, the ques-
tion is no longer whether cooperation is 
possible, but rather in what areas coopera-
tion is most likely and most beneficial. A 
package of the aforementioned areas – from 
energy market design to ETS, from coopera-
tion on PV to e-mobility – is a first step 
in noting not only that there are areas of 
synergy in the bilateral relationship, but 
also that cooperation on these issues would 
help advance broader EU goals related to 
energy security and sustainability. These 
areas of common interest should be ad-
dressed while keeping the broader picture 
in focus in the hopes that progress on con-
crete issues and cooperation on specific 
projects can help create an atmosphere of 
trust and the space needed to address the 
broader and more difficult issues at stake 
in the bilateral relationship. 
Given these potential areas of shared 
interest amid broader ongoing areas of 
difference, it is important that policy-
makers, private-sector stakeholders and 
industry, and the think tank community 
tackle these areas of difference while 
capitalizing on potential areas of coopera-
tion. Of course, it is important that both 
countries keep the European energy policy 
context in mind. In Germany and Poland, 
a growing scepticism toward the European 
Commission and its role in energy issues 
has seemed to emerge. This is particularly 
striking in Poland, which has regarded the 
Commission as an important ally for im-
proving its energy security. Progress on 
the identified areas of cooperation should 
be prioritized and viewed as a means to 
advance broader EU goals while simulta-
neously, and incrementally, building trust 
and strengthening the bilateral relation-
ship. Controversial topics have to be kept 
on the table and discussed repeatedly, if 
necessary, for progress to be made. 
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